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Abstract 
Eliminativists sometimes invoke evolutionary debunking arguments against ordinary object 
beliefs, either to help them establish object skepticism or to soften the appeal of commonsense 
ontology. I argue that object debunkers face a self-defeat problem: their conclusion undermines 
the scientific support for one of their premises, because evolutionary biology depends on our 
object beliefs. Using some work on reductionism and multiple realizability from the philosophy 
of science, I argue that it will not suffice for an eliminativist debunker to simply appeal to some 
object-free surrogate theory of evolution that results from converting any scientific proposition 
about some object K into a proposition about simples arranged K-wise. In the process, I examine 
some hazards peculiar to eliminative reductions of scientific theories, and propose a trilemma for 
eliminativists who attempt to recoup generality for ontologically sparse reducing theories by 
appealing to pluralities of simples arranged K-wise. The paper is intended to define and develop 
the object debunker’s self-defeat problem for further study, and to clarify some of the ways 
sparse and abundant ontologies interact with scientific theory. 
 
 
1 “Eliminativism and Evolutionary Debunking” by Jeffrey N. Bagwell is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 US. 
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1. Introduction 
Eliminativists sometimes invoke evolutionary debunking arguments against ordinary object 
beliefs, either to help them establish skepticism about such objects or to break down one’s 
resistance to abandoning common sense ontology.2 My purpose in this paper is to show that the 
eliminativist debunker faces a self-defeat problem. Her premises appeal to the theory of 
evolution by natural selection and her conclusion is skepticism about ordinary objects. However, 
evolutionary theory is about ordinary objects; it systematically appeals to our object beliefs. I 
argue that simply converting each scientific proposition about some ordinary object K into a 
proposition about simples arranged K-wise does not circumvent the problem. 
My reasons are as follows. Attempts to recast the propositions of evolutionary theory in 
terms of simples arranged K-wise commit the eliminativist to a problematic form of reductionism 
about scientific theories. The eliminativist’s low-level surrogate theory of evolution is ultimately 
unable to explain how the human perceptual system evolved because it will lack the needed 
generality and explanatory power. This undermines the justification for one of the debunker’s 
premises. 
Here is a bird’s-eye view of the paper. In Section 2, I state and explain an evolutionary 
debunking argument against ordinary objects. In Section 3, I sketch the self-defeat problem for 
object debunking arguments by exploring the object dependency of evolutionary theory. In 
Section 4, I sketch two popular variants of a K-wise conversion strategy and evaluate their 
prospects for running the debunking argument. In Sections 5 and 6, I show that using the K-wise 
conversion strategy commits the debunker to a form of scientific reductionism, and that the 
 
2 I have in mind Merricks (2001: 72-76) and Benovsky (2015: §2). But see Korman (2019: §2 n7) for a more 
complete list of those invoking debunking arguments to support various kinds of departures from common sense 
ontologies. 
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resulting surrogate, low-level theory will lack generality. In section 7, I argue that because it 
lacks generality, the eliminativist’s surrogate theory will be limited in its ability to predict or 
explain relevant phenomena and to utilize existing evidence. In section 8, I show why attempts to 
recoup generality in terms of pluralities of simples arranged K-wise fail. 
2. Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Ordinary Objects 
Debunking arguments target certain kinds of beliefs in order to establish some limited form of 
skepticism. Evolutionary debunking arguments rely on the fact that our evolutionary history 
predisposes us to form certain kinds of beliefs—not because these beliefs are true, but simply 
because they increased our ancestors’ reproductive fitness. Learning that you are just hard-wired 
to believe that p under the right conditions, regardless of whether p is true or not, serves as a 
defeater for your normal justifications as to why you believe that p. 
You probably believe that there are visible, medium-sized solid objects all around you 
because it seems as if there are. This seeming might be a sufficient normal justification for 
believing that ordinary objects like trees exist as you go about your day. But once the object 
debunker convinces you that your reason for believing in trees has nothing to do with whether or 
not there are trees and everything to do with what was adaptive for your ancestors to believe, this 
defeats such a normal justification. Your tree beliefs are thereby debunked.3  
Here is an evolutionary debunking argument against ordinary objects (EDO): 
 
3 In metaethics, evolutionary debunkers sometimes make the plausible assumption that while moral realism is 
vulnerable to this kind of skeptical argument, realism about ordinary objects is safe because one can provide an 
evolutionary vindication for our believing that ordinary objects are real. For instance, Sharon Street (2006:160-1n) 
notes that facts about salient objects in the environment such as predators, obstacles, or other hazards, could 
plausibly factor into our best explanations of why we form beliefs about them. Having a capacity to track these 
object facts would have bestowed a clear adaptive benefit on our ancestors: creatures believing that predators exist 
and are dangerous would tend to avoid predators and survive to reproduce. Thus, evolution seems to vindicate our 
object beliefs. For a more detailed counterargument to the supposed evolutionary vindication of object beliefs, see 
Korman (2019: 342-45). 
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(EDO1) The best explanation of your ordinary object beliefs is that you only believe 
there are ordinary objects because you are hard-wired by evolution to believe in 
them in the presence of matter arranged object-wise—irrespective of whether 
it’s true or not that there are ordinary objects. 
 (EDO2) If EDO1 is true, then you are not justified in retaining your object beliefs.4 
 (EDO3) So, you are not justified in retaining your object beliefs.5 
EDO1 relies on one plausible interpretation of the evolutionary psychology of human 
perception. Modern humans believe in the existence of ordinary objects like trees based on their 
having sensory experiences as of trees existing. These experiences are the result of an evolved 
perceptual system. According to the debunker, our ancestors’ perceptual systems evolved to 
track adaptively relevant matter (e.g., matter arranged food-wise, mate-wise, or predator-wise) 
well enough to out-compete reproductive rivals; at the same time, they may very well have 
evolved to have false beliefs about ordinary objects. Our predisposition to believe in ordinary 
objects need not be the result of such objects existing in the ancestral environment; rather, they 
simply need to have conferred a reproductive advantage over rivals who inherited different 
perceptual predispositions (or to have introduced no substantial reproductive disadvantage).  
The final clause, “irrespective of whether it’s true or not that there are ordinary objects,” 
bears some unpacking. The basic idea here is that introducing ordinary object facts adds nothing 
to the above causal explanation; rather, it makes our explanation less parsimonious, clear, and 
 
4 We can assume, if we like, that one must be aware of this defeater to lose any justification one already has for 
object beliefs. This will not affect my discussion, as my focus is on whether the argument is self-defeating or not. 
5 This argument is loosely adapted from Korman (2019: 340). 
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illuminating.6 The parsimony concern may be simply about injecting additional objects and 
object facts into our ontology when we already have a complete causal explanation on hand. This 
usually involves the idea that ordinary objects (or facts about composition) are causally inert in 
themselves, or are mere causal overdeterminers. Positing such an overdetermining cause may 
itself be objectionably unparsimonious, or it may conflict with the notion that to exist is to have 
causal powers.7 
In EDO2 we are assuming that whatever our reasons for believing in ordinary objects in 
the first place, they only merit continued ontological commitment if they are essential to our best 
explanations of why we believe in them. But if EDO1 is true, our best explanations of why we 
believe in ordinary objects don’t make any essential reference to ordinary objects. This is true 
even if ordinary objects happen to exist. Accordingly, EDO2 captures the fact that EDO1 is a 
defeater for our normal reasons for believing in ordinary objects. 
3. The Prima Facie Self-Defeat Problem for EDO 
Scientific theories like evolutionary biology systematically appeal to our perceptual beliefs about 
ordinary objects. If we reject these object beliefs, we jeopardize not only our theories’ 
explanations and laws, but also our empirical evidence and our ability to rank theories based on 
 
6 For a detailed exposition of this take on the debunking argument, developed as a Sharon-Street style Darwinian 
dilemma for the object realist, see Korman (2019: 342-45). For a very different, earlier take on the causal worry in 
object debunking arguments, in which the causal connection between a tree and our tree belief is at best a deviant 
one, see Korman (2014: §5). 
7 On this latter point, see Merricks (2001: 65). For an account of how Merricks’ causal overdetermination argument 
works as a defeater, see Merricks (2003: 738-43). For a more recent version of the overdetermination argument, see 
Merricks (2017). For an overview of the overdetermination argument and some replies, see Korman (2015: Ch.10) 
6 
 
such evidence.89 In this section, I will elaborate on each of these points, and show why they 
collectively spell self-defeat for the object debunker.10  
I call the self-defeat problem prima facie because it will be apparent to anyone from the 
standpoint of commonsense ontology. However, seasoned eliminativists may already be eager to 
dispute the claim, armed with strategies to reinterpret or recast scientific propositions to rid them 
of ordinary object commitments. They and other impatient readers are free to skip ahead to 
section four. 
Let us consider an example of the kind of thing evolutionary theory was developed to 
explain. Why do certain species of Galapagos finches endemic to a particular island have 
substantially bigger beaks than those of finches on neighboring islands—beaks that allow them 
to crack open the thick-shelled seed capsules that happen to drop from trees that flourish on their 
island in particular? The answer to this will inform broader theoretical questions such as: How 
do species come to have qualities that make them seem well-suited to their environments? How 
does speciation occur? What even is a species?  
Note that when we formulate questions about the concrete explananda of evolutionary 
theory, we must appeal to perceptual beliefs about finches, beaks, islands, and various ordinary 
objects in a finch’s environment such as seeds, shells, and trees. Likewise, our broader 
theoretical questions about how a species relates to its environment over time appeal to beliefs 
about patterns involving ordinary objects: that there are living organisms of various kinds, that 
 
8 For instance, observations made through a microscope all depend on some theory of how the microscope and its 
parts—all ordinary objects—work, and why we should trust them. 
9 Williamson (2007: 223-4) mentions several of these worries in considering the promises of reductionism and their 
consequences for science. 
10 Eliminativists who are instrumentalists about science may be ready to bite the bullet and accept any epistemic 
consequences of object skepticism. However, if they wish to convince an audience by using the debunking 
argument, they too need to resolve the self-defeat problem. 
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organisms bear properties, that some of these properties are adaptive with respect to an 
environment, and that an organism’s environment is made up of all kinds of ordinary objects.1112 
The Darwinian explanans that answer these questions similarly depend on ordinary 
objects. Here is a rough explanation of why the finches on the island evolved bigger beaks. Over 
time, variation in beak size in the island’s finch population gave a reproductive advantage to 
finches with bigger beaks, because only the finches with bigger beaks were able to eat certain 
difficult-to-access seeds that are abundant on their island even during times of great scarcity. The 
trait for bigger beaks was passed on to their offspring, who were more numerous than those of 
their rivals with smaller beaks. This process repeated over the course of many generations, with 
the result that all finches on the island now have the trait of bigger beaks.13 Note that our 
explanation implicitly appeals to patterns exhibited by organisms, such as heredity, phenotypic 
variation, and differential reproduction.14 This explanation supports an evolutionary law: given 
that variation exists regarding a specific trait (here, beak size), if one variant gives individuals 
possessing it a reproductive advantage because it helps its possessors cope more effectively with 
selective pressures in the environment (here, the scarcity of food), this variant will become more 
frequent in succeeding generations, eventually replacing rival variants throughout an entire 
reproductive population.  
 
11 This presents a problem for eliminativists like van Inwagen (1990), who allow an exception for organisms, but not 
the ordinary objects that make up their environments. Inanimate objects play important roles as selective pressures 
on organisms. 
12 Note that even tools and methods that allow us to look beyond ordinary objects (say, into microscopica) depend 
on object beliefs. How does one know how to use a microscope, or trust its deliverances, if one doesn’t believe it 
exists? Both Merricks (2001:175) and Williamson (2007: 223) raise this point. 
13 This is a greatly simplified account of one set of dynamics drawn from a large and formidably complex 
ecosystem. Often, this kind of niche specialization is observed between different species of finch on the same island 
during periods of scarcity due to drought and subsequent famine. See Weiner (1994) for an in-depth picture. 
14Of course, not all organisms are ordinary objects (e.g., bacteria and other microscopica). But if one is ruling out 
ordinary objects, unless one has an exception for some composite objects like DNA strands, one will have nothing 
upon which to base generalized properties like heredity. 
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Let us now turn to the question of evolutionary theory’s justification. Why is the theory 
better than its rivals as an explanation of the complexity, diversity, and distribution of life on 
earth? To do this, we will examine one theoretical virtue natural selection is thought to have in 
spades: its explanatory power. A theory has greater explanatory power than its rivals when, all 
things being equal, it leaves fewer aspects of its subject matter a mystery. The following 
simplified example serves to give a sense of how these comparative explanations depend on data 
in terms of ordinary objects. 
Traditionally, evolution by natural selection has had one main rival: creationism. This is 
the view that the species we see all around us were individually created for their environments, 
as opposed to being descended with modification by natural processes from ancestral species 
over countless generations.15 We will compare the way each theory handles the following sets of 
observations: In addition to the finches that developed big beaks, there were finches on different 
islands with smaller, more delicate beaks that seem well adapted for the diet available in their 
own environments. Both groups of finches bear striking resemblances to each other and to birds 
on the nearby mainland of South America. 
Creationism would maintain that each species of bird was specially created for its 
particular island environment. This explains why each finch population is particularly well-suited 
to its island environment but does not explain their similarity to the mainland finches. However, 
there is no apparent reason the creator should make these island finch species resemble those on 
 
15 Though in the minds of most biologists evolutionary theory has no serious rival, there are robust disagreements 
within evolutionary theory about, e.g., the specific mechanisms of adaptive change and the role natural selection 
plays in combination with other factors. These intra-theoretical disputes depend on data in terms of ordinary objects. 
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the mainland, who are not particularly well-adapted for any of these island micro-environments. 
Creationism leaves this striking pattern a mystery.16 
By contrast, evolutionary theory suggests that the finches on the mainland represent an 
ancestral species that migrated to the islands in the distant past and then diverged into sub-
species, as finches on each island adapted to the selective pressures of their new environment but 
were cut off from interbreeding with the finches on the other islands. These considerations seem 
to favor the evolutionary explanation, because it can explain the larger set of observations—
those about the island birds and the mainland birds—better than its rival. 
However, if we embrace skepticism about ordinary objects, we cannot cite the presence 
of a common ancestor as something evolutionary theory explains better than its rivals. Both 
ancestors and descendants here are birds—ordinary objects—populating an environment filled 
with ordinary objects. An object skeptic seems to lose any reason to consider evolutionary theory 
to be the best explanation of its subject matter. In fact, she seems to be in no position to accept 
evolutionary theory at all: its very subject matter—as well as its laws, explanations, observations, 
and methods—depend on appeals to perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects; and it must rely 
on such appeals to display its virtues against competing theories. Object skepticism leaves 
evolutionary theory fundamentally unjustified.17 
This lack of justification undermines EDO1, since we now have no reason to believe the 
evolutionary hypothesis that selective pressures shaped the mechanisms in our ancestors’ brains 
 
16 In fact, creationism’s explanation fits the observations so loosely it would be compatible with wildly different 
observations: for instance, if the finches on various islands did not resemble each other—or the finches on the 
mainland—at all, or if our big-beaked finches were identical copies of some species on the opposite side of the 
globe with a similar micro-environment. 
17 That is, if the theory remains coherent with its very subject matter removed from discussion. 
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responsible for converting perceived qualities into representations of three-dimensional objects.18 
And this spells self-defeat for the object debunker, because it puts the skeptical conclusion 
EDO3 at odds with the premise EDO1. We cannot rationally accept an argument wherein the 
conclusion undermines one of the premises.19 
In the following sections, I will explore a strategy for converting propositions of 
evolutionary theory about any ordinary object K into those about simples arranged K-wise. I will 
examine how it affects her appeal to evolutionary science and show why it ultimately cannot 
save the debunking argument. I hope to convince the reader that the self-defeat problem is not 
just prima facie; rather, it is a deep and persistent problem for the debunker. 
4. Running the Debunking Argument Without Objects 
In this section, I will describe two strategies for an eliminativist who wants to run the debunking 
argument while avoiding the self-defeat problem. Both involve converting the propositions of 
evolutionary theory into object-free propositions, and both originated as solutions to the problem 
of explaining why most people can be reasonable, though they hold many false, object-laden 
perceptual beliefs. The two strategies are compatibilism and incompatibilism.20  
 
18 Premise EDO1 could still succeed on other grounds, of course, assuming those arguments in support of it do not 
similarly rely on ordinary objects. However, barring arguments that culture is the sole factor responsible for biasing 
us toward believing in ordinary objects, evolutionary debunking arguments would lose their distinctive force as 
arguments for EDO1: they provide positive, empirical evidence that our object beliefs are unrelated to object facts. 
This crucially distinguishes them from more universal kinds of skepticism (Vavova 2015: 105-6). Cultural 
debunking arguments also arguably presuppose an evolutionary backstory. To be able to process language and other 
cultural information was an adaptation that bestowed clear reproductive advantages on our ancestors. But the 
relationship between Darwinian evolution and exclusively cultural predispositions to believe in ordinary objects is at 
best complex, indirect, and controversial. 
19 My position in this dilemma is that we should reject EDO1, because we can meet the explanatory challenge by 
invoking the results of perceptual psychology. Explication of this is outside the scope of this paper. 
20 In my terminology, I follow O’Leary-Hawthorne and Michael (1996), who use ‘compatibilism’ to describe van 
Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy (see van Inwagen 1990: Ch.10-11; 2014). Korman (2009) develops and utilizes this 
distinction as a way of contrasting van Inwagen’s strategy from the views of incompatibilists like Merricks (2001: 
Ch.7). My versions of compatibilism and incompatibilism here are loosely based on the views of van Inwagen and 
Merricks. 
11 
 
In either case, to simplify our discussion let us assume that the debunker is a nihilist 
about composition. Think of this as an extreme kind of eliminativist who rejects composition 
altogether and believes all objects are mereologically simple (that is, partless or 
uncomposed).2122 To explain our experiences of a world apparently filled with visible objects, a 
nihilist holds that simples act together in various ways to cause the appearance of ordinary 
objects and those macroscopic effects we attribute to them. 
Compatibilism is the view that there is no real conflict between the beliefs of ordinary 
non-philosophers (the folk) and those of revisionary ontologists. A compatibilist holds that 
because the folk are speaking outside the ontology room, their sentences should be interpreted 
differently than those uttered inside the ontology room. This is because the ontology room is a 
different context of utterance from the outside world—including the world of scientists. 
Philosophers involved in academic debate who say, “there is a table” would be expressing a false 
proposition, while ordinary folk in the course of their normal lives who utter the same sentence 
would be expressing a true proposition—provided  they were in the presence of some simples 
arranged tablewise.  
Compatibilists regard folk utterances of “there is a table” as ontologically neutral, 
uncommitted to the existence of ordinary objects. The truth-conditions of such folk utterances 
are determined by generating and evaluating a paraphrase of the original: “there is a table” 
 
21 Not all nihilists are eliminativists, nor are all eliminativists nihilists. Examples of non-nihilist eliminativists 
include van Inwagen (1990), who famously makes exceptions for living organisms, and Merricks (2001), who 
makes exceptions for conscious beings. An example of a non-eliminativist nihilist is Contessa (2014), who defines a 
kind of nihilism that resists ordinary object eliminativism. In addition, it is possible for a nihilist to hold the odd 
position that ordinary objects are mereologically simple. 
22The debunker may try to be neutral about these matters and just point to finch-wise experiences being caused by 
something in a certain region. But if she accepts the in-principle possibility of giving a complete lower-level causal, 
scientific account, her options are restricted. The stuff in that region must be either simples, composites, or gunk. 
And (as will become clear in section 5) gunk wouldn’t support the kind of reductive causal story the eliminativist 
needs to tell, because in a gunky world causation does not bottom out at some specific level of explanation.  
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becomes “there are some simples arranged table-wise.” This strategy aims to vindicate the 
reasonableness of folk discourse by capturing what is correct in everyday speech involving 
ordinary objects. 
Incompatibilism is the view that there really is a conflict between folk beliefs and those 
of revisionary ontologists. An incompatibilist makes no distinction between what is uttered 
inside or outside the ontology room, holding that both philosophers and the folk are stating a 
false proposition when they utter “there is a table.” The incompatibilist still must explain how 
most people can believe false things and still be reasonable—and, crucially, what makes false 
beliefs about tables more reasonable than false beliefs about unicorns.  
To solve this problem, the incompatibilist adds an epistemic category here: beliefs about 
things like tables are false, but nearly as good as true, while beliefs about unicorns are merely 
false. We can identify beliefs that are nearly as good as true by employing this kind of rule: “Any 
folk-ontological claim of the form ‘F exists’ is nearly as good as true if and only if (i) ‘F exists’ 
is false and (ii) there are things arranged F-wise” (Merricks 2001: 171-74). Beliefs that are nearly 
as good as true are still false, but they can serve valuable functions such as warranting other 
(true) beliefs. Moreover, this distinction allows the incompatibilist to hold that scientists and 
other ordinary folk are reasonable because their beliefs, though false, have some measure of 
epistemic virtue. 
In their solutions to the problem of reasonableness, both compatibilists and 
incompatibilists make use of a similar strategy: take any (false) proposition about some ordinary 
object K and convert it into a (true) proposition about simples arranged K-wise.23 The 
compatibilist uses this as a truth-maker for statements about ordinary objects made outside the 
 
23 See, e.g., Merricks (2001: Ch.1) and van Inwagen (1990: Ch.11) for versions of the K-wise strategy. 
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ontology room. “There is a finch” is true if and only if the ontologically neutral paraphrase 
“there are simples arranged finch-wise” is true. For the incompatibilist, statements like “There 
are some simples arranged finch-wise” are nearly-as-good-as-true-makers. The nearby 
metaphysical fact that there are some simples arranged finch-wise makes “There is a finch” 
nearly as good as true; however, it is not assumed to be a paraphrase of the speaker’s words 
(however loose), let alone a truth-maker. “There is a finch” is still false—but it’s the good kind 
of false. 
In order to run the debunking argument, both compatibilists and incompatibilists need to 
convert into K-wise terms the collection of all propositions necessary for evolutionary theory and 
its justification.24 Let us call this collection E. Included in E are all propositions either (i) 
composing the theory of evolution (propositions of law, method, and supporting explanatory 
discourse) or (ii) serving as evidence for that theory (propositions of observation). Recasting the 
propositions of E according to the K-wise conversion strategy, we generate a different collection 
of propositions. Let us call this ELite. An eliminativist doesn’t need to be skeptical about the 
propositions of ELite, because they are not about ordinary objects (or any composite objects). 
Let’s return to our two strategies and see how they fare with ELite in hand. 
Compatibilism faces a dilemma. It holds that E is true when expounded by scientists, 
who work outside the ontology room, because when scientists utter sentences that appear to be 
expressing propositions of E, they are really expressing propositions of ELite. So, the 
compatibilist has an eliminativist-friendly way of justifying EDO1. However, outside the 
ontology room eliminativism appears to be false because it entails that “There are some finches” 
 
24 Hereafter I will use ‘conversion’ instead of ‘paraphrase’ to describe what the eliminativist is doing, since 
‘paraphrase’ implies the intent is to preserve the meaning of the original statement. This would only apply to the 
compatibilist strategy. 
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is false.25 But we’ve already established that outside the ontology room this statement is true. So, 
EDO3 is false. However, back inside the ontology room, E is still an unjustified theory made up 
of false propositions about ordinary objects. So, the compatibilist can’t successfully run the 
debunking argument either inside or outside the ontology room.  
 My view is that the compatibilist is ultimately forced to abandon this distinction, and her 
view ultimately collapses into incompatibilism. First, the ontology room seems to be the 
appropriate place to run the debunking argument. It seems we are there right now, and anyone 
hearing EDO seems to be thereby ushered inside. Second, to run EDO outside the ontology 
room, the compatibilist would need some reason to reinterpret eliminativism out there such that 
it remains true. This move seems completely unmotivated and ad hoc.26 Third, Trenton Merricks 
(2014) has given solid reasons why it is implausible that we should interpret the folk as making 
ontologically neutral statements when they make claims stating or presupposing ordinary objects 
in their ordinary lives, and in general why any revisionary ontologist should reject the 
compatibilist’s distinction.27 Finally, ELite cannot be a truth-maker for E because it is—as we will 
see especially in sections 7 and 8—a different theory from E. It has different laws, explananda, 
and theoretical virtues. Accordingly, its propositions have different truth-conditions from those 
of E, making them unsuitable as truth-making paraphrases.  
Incompatibilism, it seems, is the only viable strategy. From the outset, the incompatibilist 
considers ELite to be a separate theory from E, not a mere paraphrase. She uses ELite to support 
EDO1Lite, the first premise of an object-free version of the debunking argument, which we’ll call  
 
25 By modus tollens, if it’s false that “There are some finches” is false, then it’s false that eliminativism is true. 
26 The distinction as presented in van Inwagen doesn’t offer any clues (1990: Ch10-11; 2014). If we try to render 
either eliminativism or EDO in terms of ontologically neutral paraphrase, the results would seem to be incoherent. 
27 Among his reasons are that the ontology room doesn’t seem to be a genuine context of utterance, and that the 
distinction is ultimately hostile to revisionary ontology and indeed to any kind of revisionism. 
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EDOLite.
28 She accepts that E is false, but believes it is nearly as good as true. Apart from its 
widespread appeals to false beliefs in ordinary objects, E has a certain trustworthiness that 
explains why it is worth invoking in EDO. This trustworthiness depends on there being some 
corresponding proposition of ELite about simples arranged K-wise for every proposition of E 
about some object K. Accordingly, she believes that every scientist who believed he observed a 
finch (and wasn’t deceived, e.g., by perceptual illusion) had perceptions caused by simples 
arranged finch-wise. She also believes that inferences drawn from such false observational 
beliefs can confer some kind of justification or warrant.29 ELite is a kind of conversion or 
recasting of the false, object-laden propositions of E into propositions that express these closely 
related truths about simples arranged K-wise. 
 We will now assume that the eliminativist is an incompatibilist in the above sense. In the 
next section, I will explore the eliminativist’s scientific commitments in more depth. 
5. The Eliminativist K-wise Strategy and Scientific Reductionism* 
Despite its promise, this K-wise conversion strategy leaves us several reasons to be skeptical. 
The principal problem for an eliminativist surrogate of evolutionary theory is that the 
propositions of ELite do not exist. And it’s not obvious that we can recast, without epistemic loss, 
all needed propositions of E into propositions that do not express commitments to ordinary 
objects.30 For instance, there may be technical problems with the kind of plural reference and 
quantification needed for a general and systematic K-wise conversion strategy.31 However, in 
 
28 For present purposes, I will assume there is nothing problematic about providing object-free conversions of 
EDO1, EDO2, and EDO3 (that is, EDO1Lite, EDO2Lite, and EDO3Lite). 
29 Merricks is cagey about how this warranting happens. For instance, it could depend on the relation to the nearly-
as-good-as-true belief, or it could depend on the relation to a nearby truth about simples (2001: 171-74). 
30 Williamson (2007: 223) briefly raises this worry. 
31 For instance, Uzquiano (2004) argues that in order to demonstrate the plausibility of the needed kind of 
quantification—a truly plurally plural quantification—one needs to supplement it with additional resources that will 
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this section I will raise a different problem: even if it turns out to be easy to convert propositions 
of E into propositions about simples arranged K-wise, the eliminativist is committed to a kind of 
scientific reductionism that ultimately limits the capabilities of ELite as a scientific theory. 
Take the proposition that this finch is brown-beaked. The debunker could convert this 
into the proposition that some of these simples arranged finch-wise are arranged brown-beak-
wise. However, to do so expresses not just a metaphysical commitment but also a physical, 
scientific one: the real objects of scientific study here—the things doing the causal work—are 
not finches but microscopic objects arranged finch-wise and brown-beak-wise. 
What happens when we take K-wise propositions seriously in physical terms? If simples 
are microscopic, partless, causally efficacious objects, they must be among the smallest things 
scientists currently study (i.e., quarks, leptons), or else they are some as-yet-unidentified things 
on an even smaller scale. Whatever they turn out to be, simples would seem to belong to 
quantum physics. 
The eliminativist implies that the story of finches can, at least in principle, be replaced by 
a story about finch-wise things at the level of quantum physics. Moreover, it should be told at the 
quantum level if we are to abandon talk of ordinary objects. Thus, ELite should ultimately not be 
composed of propositions about simples arranged K-wise, but of propositions that describe 
quantum particles and their various properties of motion, mass, charge, position, or the like that 
make up their being arranged K-wise. The eliminativist is committed to some kind of 
reductionism in science—presumably to the in-principle possibility of reducing E to quantum 
physics, with ELite being the reducing theory. 
 
ultimately result in costly ontological trade-offs for an eliminativist. Uzquiano speaks of ‘paraphrase’ because he is 
criticizing van Inwagen’s position (in 1990: Ch.10-11). Hereafter, I will only speak of converting or recasting these 
propositions, as the incompatibilist doesn’t claim her K-wise propositions are literal interpretations of the source 
statement. 
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This is not a typical kind of scientific reductionism, so let us speak of reductionism* (and 
of reduction*, reducing*, etc.) to describe the eliminativist’s commitments. Typically, a 
reductionist does not regard the reduced, higher-level theory as false. But for the eliminativist, E 
is a false (but nearly as good as true) higher-level theory that is merely a means to the true 
lower-level theory ELite. Once the reduction* is complete, we should not need or want to appeal 
to the higher-level theory: we climb down the ladder and kick it away.  
Though false, E does have some measure of epistemic virtue that motivates the 
debunker’s appealing to it in the first place. Reduction* to ELite should preserve as much of this 
virtue as possible. Because E’s dependence on ordinary object beliefs is systematic, the 
eliminativist needs for the reduction* to also be systematic in nature. This ensures that it is 
possible to reduce* every proposition of E needed to run the debunking argument to some 
proposition of ELite. Note that the reduction* of each needed proposition of E about some 
ordinary object K also confirms that proposition is indeed nearly as good as true, because it 
establishes there is some nearby truth about quarks arranged K-wise.32 
The standard view of scientific theory reduction involves the idea that one body of 
scientific knowledge can be reduced to another—specifically, that some theory TA reduces 
another theory TB if TA logically entails TB. This is usually understood to require bridge 
principles that establish logical relations between higher-level kinds in TB with lower-level kinds 
in TA. Of special epistemic importance is that the laws of the lower-level theory, combined with 
bridge principles, entail the laws of the higher-level theory. This demonstrates that the 
 
32 Hereafter, for simplicity we will assume that all mereological simples are quarks, and that quarks stand in for all 
elementary particles. This is a convention, like calling mereological simples “atoms.” I use it to stress that ELite is 
made up of propositions about physical particles—not merely metaphysical posits. 
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knowledge contained in the higher-level theory’s generalizations is contained in the lower level, 
reducing theory.33 
The eliminativist denies that any proposition SLite of ELite about elementary particles, 
together with bridge principles, entails some proposition S of E about ordinary objects. Claims 
about ordinary objects—and whatever entails them—are false. Rather, she would need a rule like 
the following: what SLite plus bridge principles entails is some proposition S* that entails that 
some proposition S of E is nearly as good as true. Given this qualification, the eliminativist can 
relate propositions of ELite to those of E in a general, systematic manner.
34 
Before moving on, I want to address the objection that ELite is really an utterly 
independent theory from E, with an entirely independent justification. The thought runs like this: 
all this talk of preserving justification or other epistemic virtues from E is misplaced. After all, 
the theory is false, and we shouldn’t worry about what we’re taking away from a theory we 
ultimately reject anyway. 
The reasons to reject this view are simple. If ELite were an entirely new science, 
independent from E in every way, it would not yet exist—nor would it be justified. Currently its 
laws and explanations are unwritten, its hypotheses untested. This would not meet the 
debunker’s needs for running EDOLite. 
The debunker's audience is those who believe the results of E but not (yet) in 
eliminativism. This audience would not be justified in accepting the pronouncements of an 
unknown, untested science as support for EDO1Lite. Rather than appealing to the results of an 
 
33 See Nagel (1961: Ch.11) for a classic statement of the view, and Brigandt and Love (2017: §3.1) for a useful 
overview. 
34 The picture looks something like the following. Proposition SLite is a description of what elementary particles are 
doing in a particular situation. Combined with bridge principles, SLite entails proposition S*: that there are some 
simples arranged finch-wise (or perhaps that there is a plurality of simples arranged finch-wise or that there is a 
finch-wise arrangement of simples). Proposition S* entails that proposition S of E—that there is a finch—is nearly 
as good as true. 
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established science, or some principled modification of it, the eliminativist would be appealing to 
the in-principle possibility of a from-scratch theory of human evolution in terms of quarks, the 
possibility that it would say the needed things about human perceptual beliefs in ordinary objects 
to support EDO1Lite—and the possibility that we should believe what it says.  
Ultimately, even a completely new theory would be judged by whether and how it tells 
the same story E tells so clearly and with such authority. At present, the only way we can get 
even a rough sense of how such a theory would compare to E is to begin with E and imagine 
what it would take to reduce* it to the lowest level in a principled way. 
As noted above, ELite is not a reduction in the conventional sense, but a surrogate theory 
that replaces E by capturing as much content from E’s propositions as possible in an object-free 
way. While ELite doesn’t need to have a surrogate claim for every proposition of E, it does need to 
be able to reproduce E’s explanation of human perceptual beliefs, and to be justified enough for 
us to believe it over its competitors. This justification comes not from running new experiments 
but from taking existing propositions of observation, law, and explanation to have been nearly as 
good as true.  
6. Reductionism* and the Generality of ELite 
The eliminativist’s reductionism* is a substantial commitment that is independent from the 
commitments of evolutionary biology as a special science, and there are initial reasons to think it 
is a liability. The first and most obvious criticism of reduction* is that a scientific reduction* 
from evolutionary biology to quantum physics simply has not been done. Without the 
propositions of ELite, it is unclear what is to take the place of E in the debunker’s argument.35  
 
35 Conventional reductions in the field of biology have been piecemeal, focused more on achieving a causal 
explanation of some part of the higher-level theory. Such reductions are not assumed to replace or eliminate the 
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 Moreover, we have reasons to believe that ELite will never materialize. For instance, there 
are problems even partially accomplishing a reduction within biology itself. It is controversial 
whether classical, Mendelian genetics can be reduced to microbiology in the sense of theory 
reduction outlined above.36 If there is substantial difficulty reducing one subfield of biology to 
another, it’s an open question whether in some kind of grand unifying reduction of all the 
relevant fields of evolutionary biology to the smallest scale of quantum physics these difficulties 
might be greatly multiplied.37 
However, my focus will not be on the lack of availability of the propositions resulting 
from reduction* to ELite, but on their undesirability. One major principled criticism that has been 
leveled against scientific reductionism is that higher-level kinds are often multiply realizable at 
the lower levels. For instance, a single phenotype in classical genetics is often realizable by 
multiple molecular mechanisms.38 In such cases, a bridge principle relating a phenotype (P) of 
classical genetics to its molecular description in terms of microbiology (M) will be disjunctive on 
the side of the reducing theory: 
 x (Px  (M1x v M2x v M3x v … v Mnx)) 
This disjunctiveness becomes important when one tries to reduce the kinds of the higher-
level theory to the kinds of the reducing theory. Unless the reducing theory captures the kinds of 
the higher-level theory in an orderly fashion, it cannot capture the full generality of the laws of 
the reduced theory. However, as Fodor and others have argued, the multiple realizability of 
 
higher-level theory. For an overview of this kind of partial, explanatory reduction in contrast to the full-fledged 
theory reduction to which the eliminativist is committed, see Brigandt and Love (2017: §3.2); for a survey of the 
kind of methodological assumptions at work in these partial reductions, see Kaiser (2011). 
36 See Hull (1972) and Kimbrough (1978). 
37 For instance, it’s prima facie unclear whether it’s possible to reduce classical genetics to quantum physics without 
first passing through the level of microbiology and dealing with the aforementioned difficulties. 
38 See Hull (1972: §3). 
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higher-level features makes this kind of type-type reduction impossible. These “laws” will seem 
more like gerrymandered collections, not sufficiently general to do the work of  real scientific 
laws.39 
To give an informal example, let’s say we want to reduce the very high-level law of 
evolutionary biology expressed by All species have a means of reproduction to the lower-level 
theory of zoology.40 Here species is multiply realized by humans and corals, and have a means 
of reproduction is multiply realized by reproduce sexually and reproduce by budding. While 
Humans reproduce sexually and Corals reproduce by budding express (lower-level) laws that are 
instances of the law expressed by All species have a means of reproduction, we would not say of 
the following sentence that it expresses a general law: All things that are humans or corals are 
things that reproduce sexually or reproduce by budding. 
 
39 Say we have some law of the higher-level theory that relates two kinds Q and R, such that x(Qx → Rx). Q is 
realized on the lower level by the kinds S1, S2,…Sn, such that the bridge principle contains a disjunction: 
x(Qx  (S1x v S2x v S3x v … v Snx)) 
Let’s also assume that the higher-level kind R is realized on the lower level by T1, T2,…Tn, such that it results in the 
bridge principle:  
x(Rx  (T1x v T2x v T3x v … v Tnx)) 
On the lower level, these realizations are related to each other in smaller laws that are instances of x(Qx → Rx), 
such as: 
x(S2x → T3x), x(S3x → T1x), x(S6x → T2x)… 
But when these are joined to replicate the form of the law x(Qx → Rx), the resulting proposition is radically 
disjunctive in a way that prevents it from being a unified law: 
x((S1x v S2x v S3x v… v Snx) → (T1x v T2x v T3x v … v Tnx)) 
The argument was raised by Fodor (1974), and developed and defended in varying forms in, e.g., Gillett (2003), 
Aizawa (2008), and Aizawa and Gillett (2011). The formalizations are adapted from Brigandt and Love (2017: 
§4.2). For a dissenting view, as well as a useful summary of the multiple realizability literature, see Polger and 
Shapiro (2016). 
40 I won’t argue for a definite position on what counts as higher-level or lower-level theories. It is plausible that 
zoology is lower level than evolutionary biology because the former makes up a part of the subject matter of the 
latter but is subject to its general laws. 
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That the lower-level kinds do not correspond neatly to the higher-level kinds means that 
there is a good reason to believe we will not be able to reduce the laws of the higher-level 
sciences in terms of the lower-level ones. We can achieve some kind of reduction according to 
the above method, but the result will not be unified laws at the lower level (Brigandt and Love 
2017: §4.2; Fodor 1974: §3).  
For the debunker, this means even if it is possible to recast enough propositions of E into 
ELite to support EDO1Lite in the debunking argument, the resulting laws of ELite will lack the 
generality of the laws of E. They will not even look to us like laws, being massively disjunctive. 
This by itself is a substantial loss in theoretical virtue.  
The eliminativist may object that we don’t need smooth, unified lower-level reductions* 
of higher-level theories. ELite has other qualities that still make it preferable to E. If so, then it is 
no strike against ELite that it doesn’t match up neatly with the kinds of the higher-level theory: 
these are exactly the things about which the debunking argument urges skepticism! 
The eliminativist may claim that ELite is superior to E because it is not false.
41 This would 
certainly be part of the story for someone already convinced of eliminativism’s truth before 
hearing EDOLite. However, because E’s falsity follows from EDO3, it would be question-begging 
to invoke this as a reason to prefer ELite—whose purpose is to establish EDO3. In the absence of 
independent arguments against ordinary objects, the rest of us can safely suspend judgment on 
whether ELite really does possess this particular virtue. 
She might also appeal to the fact that lower-level theories display different virtues than 
higher-level theories. Lower-level theories can bring out interesting and important differences 
between things that appear similar at a higher level; their forte is depth, detail, and precision. 
 
41 Strictly speaking, propositions of E may be false in places and lack a truth-value in others, depending on one’s 
view of how false presuppositions affect the truth-value of statements that depend on them.  
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Exceptions in the laws of E, for instance, often must be explained at a lower theoretical level. 
Surely these distinctive lower-level virtues count in favor of ELite (Sober 1999: 560-562).  
 However, E also has access to these lower-level virtues. As E retains commitments to 
composite objects, so it retains the ability to appeal to many different levels of explanation as 
needed. E can explain patterns in entire populations of organisms over time and can relate these 
to microscopic changes happening in the DNA of individual members. It can take advantage of 
localized reductive explanations without giving up access to higher-level kinds. However, 
because ELite eliminates higher-level kinds as a matter of principle, it loses access to such multi-
level explanations. 
 Even if ELite lacks generality without any clear compensating benefits, we must ask 
ourselves: does the loss of generality prevent ELite from supporting the debunker’s argument in 
the needed way? In the next section, I will argue that it does. 
7. Would ELite do the Work Needed by EDOLite? 
The eliminativist may contend that ELite’s messy, gerrymandered laws and explanations would 
still do the same work as E in the ways that are needed for the debunking argument. Here are 
three things that ELite needs to be able to do, in its own low-level terms. First, ELite must be able 
to explain and predict the same range of phenomena as E within evolutionary biology by 
subsuming the relevant quark situations under appropriate laws; second, in order to be justified 
ELite must be able to utilize the existing experimental results supporting E; and third, it must be 
able to capture the content of tracking statements of E, whose truth depends on identity over time 
between higher-level entities. I will argue that ELite cannot accomplish these things. 
The first problem ELite faces is that its laws don’t cover the same phenomena as those of 
E. The laws of ELite lack generality because they do not appeal to higher-level kinds like 
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composite objects. Restricted to this low level, ELite’s laws are necessarily incredibly 
particularized. Where E puts statements of law or observation in terms of increasingly complex 
kinds to express explanations, ELite must put them in terms of increasingly complex propositions 
about one kind (quarks).4243 To capture even part of the content of a law (or law-like 
generalization) of biology such as “All organisms inherit traits from their parents,” ELite must 
disjunctively list the situations involving quarks that would realize the atomic kinds in order to 
list the situations that would make up the molecular kinds, etc., that would ultimately realize the 
kind organism.44  
Because they are list-like disjunctions of the known realizations of higher-level kinds, 
propositions of law in ELite only cover a finite range of phenomena. By contrast, the laws of E 
quantify over general, higher-level terms, giving them a tremendous advantage: they are open-
ended. The proposition that all P’s are Q’s (where P is a higher-level kind) applies to all things 
that are P. It makes no difference whether they have been identified or discovered yet. Perhaps 
some things will become P’s in the future; our law about P’s would cover them, too. Perhaps we 
haven’t discovered some P’s and never will; our law says those are also Q’s. However, 
substituting for the kind P a list of things and saying these are Q’s is a very limiting strategy.45 
 
42 Or one set of kinds—it’s possible that simples are a diverse group with different properties. 
43 It also makes increasingly weak disjunctive statements as we go up the chain, as opposed to increasingly strong 
statements of increasing generality. 
44 Quarks have properties like spin, mass, charge, and position. We are to use these properties to express how 
individual quarks are arranged atom-wise. There are plausibly many, many ways individual quarks can be arranged 
atom-wise. Even if this can be specified as a mere description of spatial relationships this law will have to account 
for the varying structures of 103 kinds of atoms—each a different way of being arranged atom-wise. Through 
complex predicates, our law will specify—and this is just to establish the reference of its subject term—all the ways 
quarks can be arranged (in concert with other quarks) in ways that count as being arranged atom-wise. The 
disjointness and overall complexity of the subject terms in statements of ELite must only be compounded when the 
eliminativist needs to capture the content of statements of E about putative molecular kinds, so that ELite can capture 
the observations and laws of conventional biochemistry. In theory, we can follow this process and build ELite 
conversions of more and more complex putative scientific kinds, gradually fleshing out quark-level realizations of 
genes, cells, organs, animals, ecosystems, and environments. 
45 In the case of ELite, we would know they also have properties identified by a list of the lower-level realizations of 
some putative higher-level kind Q. 
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Without reference to P as a kind of thing, we must just keep adding things to a list and hope 
we’ve got them all. Even assuming we’re equipped with a complete list of all the known 
realizations of P, our law would still not cover novel cases of P’s we might encounter in the 
future. It seems that, except perhaps with some artificially restricted domain, a law made up of 
lists of any length would not adequately capture the propositional content of a law that All P’s 
are Q’s. 
What happens when practitioners using such disjunctive laws encounter some novel 
phenomenon that formerly would have been included under the kind ‘P’? They must add a 
disjunct somewhere in the appropriate law. This reveals a further oddity of such laws: whereas 
laws in terms of higher-level kinds can absorb new empirical data without changing, laws in 
terms of lower-level lists must change constantly to retain their predictive and explanatory 
power. Thus, no single lower-level law, not even the most up to date one, does the same work as 
the higher-level law it reduces.4647 
 In the case of ELite, we might expect this incomplete capturing of the content of higher-
level laws to be compounded by the many levels of reduction* necessary to move from human 
perceptual psychology all the way down to quantum physics. The upshot is that ELite is crippled 
 
46 Clearly, higher-level theories and their laws also need to be revised in light of novel data. But they are insulated 
from the kind of persistent reformulation described above by subsuming a wide range of potential data under general 
kinds. New data add supporting detail to the theoretical explanations supporting higher-level laws; but the laws 
themselves are stable over time, except in the rare cases where a specially designed experiment produces confuting 
evidence. 
47 Consider a law L1, which covers several low-level realizations of both P and Q: 
L1: x((P1x v P2x v P3x) → (Q1x v Q2x v Q3x)) 
Scientists later discover some new things that would have been considered realizations of the putative kinds P and 
Q, such that they produce a new law L2:  
L2: x((P1x v P2x v P3x v P4x) → (Q1x v Q2x v Q3x v Q4x)) 
The law L1 does not cover P4 or predicate Q4 of any Ps. Practitioners can keep producing new laws that include new 
realizations, but this generates a series of different laws, and no single law—not even the most inclusive, up-to-date 
version—does the work of the law that all P’s are Q’s. 
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in its ability to explain or predict novel cases explained or predicted by E. The results could be 
catastrophic for EDOLite. For instance, is the target audience for EDOLite covered by these laws, 
assuming their quantum structure is not already spelled out in the laws’ particulars? Are our 
ordinary object beliefs covered by the laws? If not, then why should we listen? It’s possible to 
answer these questions favorably for ELite; however, to do so the eliminativist must find a way to 
recover some generality in a way that’s motivated within ELite itself and that doesn’t rely on illicit 
appeals to the higher-level kinds it rejects. 
The second problem for ELite concerns the nature of the existing experimental evidence 
for E.48 Unfortunately, all the experiments conducted and observations made to test E—from 
sciences ranging from zoology to microbiology—were not designed to measure the behavior of 
quarks. In fact, every experimental finding regarding E has been radically imprecise as to what 
the quarks were doing in the situation. Assuming that we already have some serviceable low-
level law in terms of quarks, we would not know if some particular experiment supporting E 
confirmed or confuted it, or whether it represents some new quark-situation that needs to be 
added to our law for it to remain complete and current. Thus, in the absence of any recourse to 
generalities—even in terms of quark-wise things—ELite’s relation to the experimental evidence is 
unclear, as is its justification. 
Finally, ELite has a problem expressing identities over time between higher-level entities 
covered by E. Of course, the eliminativist doesn’t believe in these higher-level entities. But it 
remains a problem: for instance, the eliminativist needs to be able to express (in low-level terms) 
why the identical human organism who just had some visual experiences caused by quarks 
 
48 Conversely, the few experiments that have dealt directly with observing quarks have had the purpose of relating 
them to other subatomic particles to determine their nature and properties. These experiments were not done for the 
specific purpose of testing E, and the light they shed on E’s justification is correspondingly dim. 
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arranged object-wise now believes there is an object in front of him. This in turn depends on a 
story about why, of each member of a crucial set of ancestors, the identical ancestor that had a 
certain perceptual trait also had higher reproductive fitness than its rivals. Perhaps many details 
are dispensable for the purposes of EDOLite, but some low-level version of this central story is 
not. Likewise, the broad evolutionary picture that supports and justifies this story—from many 
subfields of biology—involves tracking individual organisms through their development, 
mating, and adaptive relationship with their environments. Without some way of appealing to 
identities between members of higher-level categories, ELite simply lacks the vocabulary to 
express this crucial explanation of our object beliefs. In ELite, the only thing capable of being 
identical to itself is a quark. 
In the next section, I examine a promising strategy for solving all three of these problems 
by appealing to pluralities of quarks arranged K-wise, and to kinds built up in those terms. 
8. Pluralities of quarks arranged K-wise, Arrangements K-wise, and Shmidentity  
The eliminativist may raise the following objection. Surely, we—and field biologists—can say 
something about the quark-situation just based on what we can observe with our own eyes. 
What’s causing the finch-wise experience I’m currently having? A plurality of quarks arranged 
finch-wise. I can make observations about the identical plurality over time, tracking it through 
changes. Similarly, I can convert propositions of observation from conventional experiments 
made about finches into propositions in terms of pluralities of quarks arranged finch-wise. These 
observations and experiments can then support ELite in roughly the same way they supported E. 
In addition, we can subsume all the low-level particulars about how quarks are arranged finch-
wise under the kind “pluralities arranged finch-wise.” We can also generalize to kinds of kinds of 
pluralities, and so on, using these to formulate object-free propositions of law and explanation at 
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whatever level we please. Soon, ELite is a theory as robustly general as E—open-ended and 
covering all phenomena relevant to EDOLite. This seems to take care of the problems with lack of 
generality outlined in section 7. 
For this strategy to work, the propositions of ELite, in terms of pluralities of simples 
arranged K-wise, must capture the content of propositions about individual objects of the kind K 
in E. Only then can ELite generalize about kinds of pluralities, kinds of kinds of pluralities, and so 
on in a way that matches the attributions in E in the ways needed to support EDOLite. A 
proposition of ELite captures the content of a proposition of E if and only if it’s true to attribute 
things to the plurality (or kind of plurality, etc.) of simples arranged K-wise in the proposition of 
ELite that are attributed to the object (or kind of object, etc.) K in the proposition of E. In other 
words, pluralities arranged finch-wise need to behave exactly like (putative) finches.  
This demand for content capturing is not arbitrary: remember that the close 
correspondence between the content of propositions of ELite about simples arranged K-wise and 
that of propositions of E about some object K both explains the trustworthiness of E and allows  
ELite to share in E’s epistemic virtues and justification.49 The content of any proposition of E that 
fails to have a corresponding proposition in ELite—as well as its justifying, explanatory, or 
predictive value—would be lost to ELite, and so would the content of any propositions dependent 
upon it. If large classes of important propositions of E were in-principle uncapturable for ELite, 
the results would be catastrophic for EDOLite. 
I argue that proponents of ELite face a trilemma here. If they simply recast propositions of 
E in terms of pluralities arranged K-wise, the resulting surrogate propositions inevitably fail to 
capture any content that involves composite objects such as finches persisting over time. 
 
49 C.f. Section 4 on incompatibilism and the end of Section 5 on the dependence of ELite on E. 
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Alternately, they can supplement propositions in terms of pluralities arranged K-wise with a new 
metaphysical relation (I’ll call it ‘shmidentity’) that obtains for pluralities arranged K-wise over 
time, allowing such propositions to capture the content related to object persistence, but at the 
cost of introducing a strange and unparsimonious metaphysical relation into all corners of the 
science; lastly, proponents of ELite can say that arrangements K-wise are what persist over time in 
its converted scientific propositions, but this introduces new entities into their ontology that have 
the earmarks of composite objects. 
 Eliminativists pursuing the strategy of generalizing in terms of pluralities arranged K-
wise must reckon with the fact that pluralities of quarks arranged finch-wise have different 
persistence conditions than do (putative) finches. At time t1, some plurality P1 includes all and 
only the quarks arranged finch-wise during some scientific observation of an individual finch F. 
But change one quark and a plurality of quarks is no longer the same plurality. Organisms like 
finches are constantly changing on the microscopic level, metabolizing food into tissues and 
passing the rest as waste, sloughing off feathers and dead skin, sustaining small injuries, or 
simply growing and aging. At t2, milliseconds later, two things have happened: first, P1 is no 
longer arranged finch-wise, as some of the quarks in this plurality have passed out of finch-wise 
arrangement; second, the quarks of some different plurality P2 are all and only the quarks 
populating F. In fact, during any observation of a single finch F over times t1… tn, scientists are 
observing a succession of pluralities of quarks arranged finch-wise, P1… Pn.5051 
Ultimately, no single plurality of quarks does the causal work of any individual finch F, 
because none remains arranged finch-wise long enough. Rather, a shifting group of quarks is 
 
50 I use ‘populate’ or ‘belong to’ as an ontologically neutral way of specifying which quarks are arranged K-wise in 
any particular arrangement K-wise at the time in question. 
51 For economy, I will hereafter just write ‘finch’ or ‘organism’ in this section. But the reader should hear ‘putative’ 
in front of any term that presupposes commitments to ordinary objects. 
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involved in the causal work of a finch over time, with new sub-groups of simples being shuttled 
in and out every millisecond. This means the proposition that the finch that laid this clutch of 
eggs is the same finch that did not reproduce last year is not captured by any corresponding 
proposition about identical pluralities arranged finch-wise. Even if the proposition is true—i.e., if 
identity holds between a finch and itself—it is false when converted into a proposition about two 
pluralities arranged finch-wise. 
The eliminativist could respond by introducing a new relation that applies to pluralities 
over time, such that a set of pluralities P1… Pn are ‘shmidentical’ at times t1… tn as long as the 
quarks were replaced in a suitably gradual manner at each stage.52 Even if Pn comprised an 
entirely different set of quarks at times t1 and tn, it could still qualify as the shmidentical plurality 
to P1 if it met the condition for gradual replacement. This would seem to circumvent the problem 
with the above proposition about the egg-laying finch. However, these conditions are too loose. 
Over enough time any two pluralities would be shmidentical, such as a finch and the tree in 
which it makes its nest. Nor is it sufficient to tie shmidentity over time to being arranged K-wise 
consistently over time. For instance, a plurality of quarks arranged finch-wise might belong at t1 
to a pregnant mother and at tn be distributed between her and her three chicks; this would not 
allow ELite to capture, e.g., propositions exclusively about the mother during t1… tn. Nor would 
this strategy forbid our propositions from tracking random or uninteresting pluralities of finch-
wise quarks from t1… tn, such as part of a beak or talon. We need shmidentity to apply 
exclusively to successions of pluralities arranged K-wise that are made up of all and only those 
quarks that populate a K-wise arrangement corresponding to a particular (putative) finch over 
 
52 See, e.g., Contessa (2014: 213-14) for a version of this strategy defending a somewhat different position. 
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time. So, ultimately shmidentity conditions must piggyback on our identity conditions for 
finches.  
However, note that the eliminativist has introduced a strange and unparsimonious new 
metaphysical relation that has to be built into ELite at every level.
53 Shmidentity holds between 
two K-wise pluralities over time whenever identity would hold between two composite objects of 
the kind K. This is a problematic reliance on counterpossible facts. It’s true that counterpossibles 
occur in scientific theories quite regularly. For instance, they feature in the antecedents of 
counterfactual conditionals whose purpose is to explain why some actual property of something 
is doing what it really is doing in contrast to an another (impossible) situation that would yield a 
different outcome (Tan 2019). However, these are localized, limited explanations. Shmidentity is 
a widespread relation that features crucially in the positive propositions of law, observation, and 
explanation of the theory, and it can only obtain between nonexistent objects. This is a radically 
different kind and level of dependence on counterpossibles from what is normally encountered in 
the sciences. The counterpossible facts about identity conditions between nonexistent objects 
would seem to be fundamental, and as numerous as there are kinds of nonexistent composite 
objects—hence the loss of parsimony.5455 
The third strategy for an eliminativist is the simplest: jettison the notion of shmidentity 
and claim that arrangements K-wise are things that can persist over time separately from any 
 
53Another oddity is that shmidentity seems to depend on clear and definite identity conditions in a way that ordinary 
science does not. E proceeds unimpeded despite such identity conditions never having been specified clearly or in 
detail, but the very definition of shmidentity presupposes the existence of those conditions. 
54 These facts cannot be reduced, e.g., to more fundamental facts about nonexistent objects, for there are no such 
facts. I’m assuming here that the eliminativist would not want to say counterpossible facts about nonexistent objects 
are reducible to facts about impossible worlds.  
55 The contrast between the usual kinds of occurrences of counterpossibles in scientific theory and the shmidentity 
relation can be illustrated by comparing two cases. In the first case, explaining entropy by appealing the 
counterfactual: if a machine were indeed a perpetual motion machine, it would never need an infusion of energy 
from the outside. (This explains why real machines need energy to run.) In the second case, taking some property 
that only perpetual motion machines have, and attributing it to real groups of machines described by one’s theory.  
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particular quarks or pluralities of quarks. An arrangement finch-wise needs has the same 
properties as finches do in E, including persisting under whatever conditions a finch would in E. 
We assume here that an arrangement has a fluctuating population of quarks and pluralities of 
quarks but is arranged in the right way over time to sustain these higher-level properties. 
But notice that the eliminativist’s ontology now looks very much as it would if it 
included composite objects. An arrangement is not a quark, nor is it any particular plurality of 
quarks. But it exists and bears attributes referenced by the propositions of law in ELite—including 
causal powers—that no quark or plurality of quarks could bear. Arrangements finch-wise are 
new entities that behave very much like composite objects. Perhaps they are finches? 
Ultimately, the eliminativist seems unable to recoup generality in terms of kinds built 
from pluralities of quarks arranged K-wise without incurring great costs in the process. This 
implies that ELite will indeed be made up of incredibly complex, particularized propositions about 
quarks, and will be subject to the limitations I outlined in sections 6 and 7. These are fatal 
liabilities for the view, indicating that ELite is inadequate to run the debunking argument.  
This mismatch between E and ELite has another unattractive consequence for the 
eliminativist. Because a vast range of crucial propositions of E cannot in principle have a 
corresponding K-wise situation to be captured by a proposition of ELite, they are not false but 
nearly as good as true. Rather, they and the substantial chunk of evolutionary biology that 
depends on them are simply false—as false as the belief that unicorns are right now trotting 
across the rainbow. 
9. Conclusion 
If my argument has been successful, I have shown four things: 
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1.) That there is a self-defeat problem facing the evolutionary debunker of ordinary 
objects. Evolutionary theory and its body of evidence depend on ordinary objects, and debunkers 
will need to reckon with this problem. I am not optimistic about the prospects for an eliminativist 
solution. I believe this argument generalizes even to more nuanced kinds of eliminativism that 
establish exceptions for certain kinds of objects, such as organisms or conscious beings. 
Evolutionary theory seems to require ordinary objects on a very wide scale to tell its story; the 
inanimate, unconscious objects making up organisms’ environments are an indispensable part of 
that story. 
2.) That eliminativists who utilize K-wise conversion strategies, believe in a complete 
low-level causal story of the world, and appeal to the results of the special sciences commit 
themselves to some form of scientific reductionism. The alternative is to appeal to a completely 
unknown, untested theory. This applies to eliminativists who run EDOLite but are, e.g., 
instrumentalists about science and claim only to be pointing out a conflict between conventional 
scientific realism and beliefs about ordinary objects. Without such a reduction, the scientific 
realist has no grounds for accepting the argument. Eliminativists who run debunking arguments 
against other kinds of beliefs (e.g., moral or aesthetic) face no self-defeat problem, but must 
reckon with the tension between their ontologies and the claims of evolutionary biology. 
3.) That to recast any propositions of E referencing ordinary objects of some kind K as  
propositions about pluralities of quarks arranged K-wise in ELite is problematic. To capture the 
needed content of the propositions of E, the proponent of ELite must find a way out of my 
trilemma as presented in section 8.  
4.) That a theory ELite resulting from a systematic, eliminative reduction* of E would 
have insufficient justification and explanatory power to support the debunking argument. As a 
34 
 
theory on the level of quarks without recourse to generality in terms of pluralities of quarks—let 
alone any higher kinds—ELite must have laws that are incredibly particularized. Thus, it sacrifices 
not only necessary breadth and power in the form of general laws and explanations, but a critical 
range of observations as well. As a result, it cannot express relevant evolutionary explanations in 
support of EDOLite, and its justification is in serious jeopardy. 
My essay has said little about permissivists, but they sometimes use debunking 
arguments to establish that there is no reason to believe that only ordinary objects exist. Given all 
the ways the universe could be carved up into objects, if our object beliefs happen to be true and 
all and only the ordinary ones exist, this could only be the result of incredible luck. Addressing 
this kind of debunking argument will have to wait for a future work, but much of what I’ve said 
here will apply to permissivists who accept Composition as Identity or some weaker whole-part 
reductionism; when appealing to E, they will have to deal with some of the same problems I’ve 
described here for the eliminativist debunker.56 
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